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1606-1660. By Bradley
Chapin. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press. 1983. Pp. xvi,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA,

203. $18.
The process by which the common law of England was received
by American jurisdictions has long been a matter of dispute among
legal historians. 1 While there seems to be a consensus that English
precedent did not come to dominate American law until after the
American Revolution,2 the early period of colonial law, from initial
colonization until the influx of English lawyers and heightened royal
interest,3 still sheds important light on the "transfer and transformation of common law in its American setting."4 It is here that Bradley
Chapin's book, Criminal Justice in Colonial America, 1606-1660, begins to fill what has been described as a glaring gap in American
legal history. 5
Chapin's work is apparently the first thorough survey of the
criminal law in all of the original colonial jurisdictions.6 Recent ef1. For a thorough examination of the reception issue, see J. GoEBEL & T.R. NAUGHTON,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (16641776) (1944); Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
EARLY AMERICAN LAW 53 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
2. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 1, at 71-72, 74-75; Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the
Making ofAmerican Law, 48 AM. L. REv. 676-82 (1912); Reinsch, The English Common Law in
the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367
(1907).
3. The development in the colonies of a legal profession in the latter half of the seventeenth century produced growing reliance on the English common law, which was familiar to
contemporary legal practitioners. Concurrently, the crown began to assert more control over
the colonies as their strategic importance in the mercantile structure became more apparent.
See Flaherty,An Introduction to Early American Legal History, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
EARLY AMERICAN LAW 3-4, 15-16 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
4. Billings, Law in Colonial America: The Reassessment ofEarly Legal History (Book Review), 81 MICH. L. REv. 953, 954 (1983).
5. A major inadequacy of extant studies of the history of American law in the seventeenth century is the absence of studies that compare the colonies with the mother country
and one colony with another. At the present time such an approach to the study of legal
history would appear to have great possibilities. Such undertakings may well do away
with the traditional lament about having to study thirteen separate jurisdictions, for in
colony after colony the historian is often much more impressed with the similarities than
the differences. The distinctions between colonies exist, of course, but even they have not
been explained or described except in the broadest terms. The uniqueness of the New
England Puritans' reforms of English law can be questioned, for example, once one has
examined the legal records of seventeenth-century Virginia.
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 13 (footnote omitted).
6. Much of the work in this area has focused on only one jurisdiction or region. See, e.g.,
J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 1; Hilkey, Legal .Developments in Colonial Massachusetts, 1631-1686, XXVII COLUMBIA STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC LAW
(1910). Other works have focused on much narrower issues. See, e.g., C. KARRAKER, Ti:iE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SHERIFF: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SHERIFF IN ENGLAND
AND THE CHESAPEAKE COLONIES, 1607-1689 (1930). For an extensive review of the literature
on early American law, see Flaherty, supra note 3.
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forts in the resurgent field of legal history7 have been characterized
by close scrutiny of primary sources, 8 and Chapin follows this lead,
drawing heavily on the records of legislative and judicial proceedings. His book is obviously the product of a comprehensive and
thoughtful consideration of these sources. The author has identified
dozens of noteworthy cases and has amassed empirical data concerning the occurrence of crime and the sources of colonial law and
procedure.
Chapin uses this information to review four major facets of colonial criminal justice: the substantive criminal law, the judicial process it entailed, the courts and officials involved in its administration,
and the nature of colonial crime. He examines the colonial jurisdictions9 individually and with reference to geographic and demographic groups. He then compares the results of these analyses with
parallel developments in the English common law.
Chapin devotes systematic attention to each facet of the colonial
criminal justice system. For example, the chapter on judicial proceedings progresses from arrest to post-conviction relief, much like
any modem criminal procedure casebook. Within this highly structured survey format, Chapin integrates the work of other legal historians with illuminating anecdotal digressions. Accounts of cases
involving crimes such as homicide, bestiality and witchcraft 10 transform what might otherwise be a dry, specialized study to one with
more general appeal.
Chapin also considers the early struggle between discretionary
justice and the strict rule of positive law, a theme often discussed in
works on colonial American law. 11 Initially, the colonies inherited
the common law principle of legal explication by judicial usage
rather than statutory enactment (p. 15). Chapin notes that by 1660
the New England colonies, 12 at least in the area of criminal law, had
7. The resurgence began in the late sixties and early seventies. Billings, supra note 4, at 953
n.I.

8. The long neglect of primary sources is discussed in Haskins, Law and Colonial Society,
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 41 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
9. There were seven initial jurisdictions: Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Maryland, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Haven.
IO. For example, Chapin details the plight of George Spencer, who was accused of bestiality. Pp. 38-39, 128-29. Spencer, who had only one eye, was accused of impregnating a sow
that had given birth to a hideously deformed, one-eyed piglet. P. 128. The explicitness of the
official record verges on the macabre and, viewed from a modem perspective, is an absurd
indictment of Puritan naivete. Chapin quotes the official record to illustrate that bestiality was
prosecuted out of a simplistic fear of half human, half animal "monsters," p. 128, as well as out
of moral indignation.
11. For a presentation of a variety of issues customarily addressed in works on colonial
law, see EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW (D. Flaherty ed. 1969) and LAW
AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (G. Billias ed. 1965).
12. Chapin often groups colonies together in a north/south dichotomy, referring to the
New England Colonies and the Chesapeake Colonies.
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shifted to a predominantly statutory system. Chapin attributes the
shift primarily to opposition to "discretionary" justice (p. 19). In
contrast to their northern counterparts, the Chesapeake colonies adhered to a discretionary, non-codified system, a choice which Chapin
attributes to political and demographic differences, as well as the absence of a strong ideological base upon which to build a code something the New England colonies had found in the example of
Moses (p. 22).
Chapin seems offended by those who would dismiss the early colonial criminal justice system as primitive. In addition to the successful shift toward simplified codes of law, he points to the relative
success of reform in the colonies as evidence of sophistication. A
primary example is opposition to the death penalty (pp. 55-58).
Capital punishment was the norm for felony convictions in England,
but in the colonies the death penalty was mandated only for murder
and treason. The death penalty was virtually abolished for property
crimes (p. 8) and was replaced by lesser corporal punishments. Chapin attributes the success of colonial reform to a lack of political and
legal obstacles, an ability to respond to problems in a more pragmatic manner, and the greater value placed on life where labor was
at a premium.
The underlying advantage of Chapin's work is that it sheds more
light on the process of reception. He refutes both the orthodox view
of early legal scholarship, which held that reception was an incident
of initial colonization, 13 and ''the frontier thesis, that beast of all
American historical burdens" (p. 145), which characterized colonial
law as "rude, untechnical popular law," 14 influenced by English and
13. This theory was espoused by two of the preeminent jurists of the nineteenth century,
Justice Story and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw. See Chafee, supra note 1, at 61-64. It holds that
reception can be inferred from the language of several of the original colonial charters. For
example, the Massachusetts Bay Charter 1628-1629 says:
That it shall ••. be lawfull .•. in any of their Generall Courts •.. from tyme to tyme to
make, ordeine, and establishe all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, !awes,
statutes, and ordinances, directions, and instructions not contrarie to the !awes of this our
realm of England, . . • and the forme of oathes warrantable by the !awes and statutes of
this our realme of England • • . and for impositions of lawful fynes, mulcts, imprisonment, or other lawfull correction, according to the course of other corporations in this our
realme of England . . . .
Chafee, supra note 1, at 57. But see Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth
Century New England, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 85-86 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969) ("In the last analysis the charter provisions are significant only as to the relations of a particular colony with the homeland, and cannot be regarded as constituting a
reliable guide to what in fact transpired in America.") (footnote omitted).
14. Reinsch, supra note 2, at 370, quoted in Chafee, supra note 1, at 65. Hilkey, see note 6
supra, and Reinsch were· the major proponents of this view of reception. See Chafee, supra
note 1, at 64-66. In the context of his study, Chapin characterizes this view of a primitive
colonial law as "fantastic," p. 146, citing the success of reform and the move toward simplified
codification of the criminal law in the colonies during this period. See text following note 11
supra.
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Biblical law, but essentially a product of unrefined invention. He
concludes:
Ifwe are to understand law development in America before 1660, we
need to abandon the noun "reception" and replace it with the verb
"carry." Emigrating Englishmen brought the law in their baggage. As
immigrants always have, they left some of their possessions behind and
would use some of what they carried with them for different purposes
than had been intended. The law that colonists installed in the new
jurisdictions was the result of conscious choice. The process of selecting from the old materials showed an awareness of the duality of the
common law. [P. 146].

In the sense that Chapin has successfully undertaken the extensive comparative analysis needed in a project of this sort, his work is
both ambitious and ground-breaking. Much of the work in this area
has focused on only one jurisdiction or region. 15 He has embraced
the difficult task of collecting and analyzing the primary sources, 16
and has made a conscious effort to avoid a problem that plagues
scholarly research on colonial America - neglect of the southern
colonies. 17 Chapin's work, however, is by no means flawless. Survey
work, by its very nature, tends toward generalization. .
For example, Chapin often illustrates points with quotations
from primary sources. While this method may be both revealing
and persuasive, it is not necessarily authoritative, for at best the
records reveal only an approximation of what really happened. Colonial records were seldom "kept in a fashion that allows reconstruction of what they recall with mathematical precision.'~ 18
Similar criticisms can be directed toward some of Chapin's attempts at quap.tification. In an effort to make a large amount of empirical data manageable, he reduces it to chart form. The success of
this technique varies greatly depending on the type of information
being processed. For example, a chart detailing all of the known
witchcraft trials prior to 1660 (pp. 118-19) works well, displaying a
large volume of essentially objective data in an accessible manner.
On the other hand, the charts devoted to the sources of colonial law
and the mode of expression (judicial versus legislative) (pp. 181-85),
though informative, tend to be misleading. For example, when noting the sources of the substantive criminal law, Chapin concludes
that 56.5% derives from English common law, 25.1 % from indigenous sources, and 18.4% from the Bible (p. 5). Chapin concedes that
his assignment of percentage values is arbitrary but contends that his
figures are a fair representation (p. 181). Nevertheless, they suggest
15. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
16. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
17. See Billings, supra note 4, at 954.
18. Id at 961.
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mathematical precision that cannot fairly be ascribed to subjective
considerations, particularly in a work relying on largely unverifiable
records that are hundreds of years old.
Ultimately, Chapin's work - essentially an exposition of what
the law was - is in some respects subject to the criticism that it, like
other studies of the colonial period, has over-emphasized institutions
and origins.19 Yet Chapin has produced a highly informative survey
of colonial criminal justice. Along the way he uses this survey to
support his own observations about the reception of the common
law. Chapin deserves much credit for surpassing so many of the limitations of previous works; a book such as this is necessary before
broader concerns can be addressed. 20 As a foundation upon which
past works may be evaluated and future work constructed, Criminal
Justice in Colonial America is a complete and concise reference work
of great value.

19. While these [origins and institutional] studies are important matters, they should not
constitute the boundaries of legal history to the detriment of more broadly conceived
studies. Professor Stanley N. Katz has recently criticized the traditional character of even
the more recent work in American legal history, which has continued to abide by oldfashioned notions about periodization and has focused on a limited range of source
materials. Katz emphasizes the need to study law broadly and to turn our concern from
what law was to how law worked.
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 33 (footnote omitted).
20. One must begin the study oflegal history by posing the right kinds of questions. For
what apparent or underlying reasons were certain legislative acts enacted? How did these
statutes reflect the basic values of the society? To what extent did legislatures abandon
control to the forces of inertia in a particular area? On what broad principles were cases
being decided in the courts? Did the laws and the judicial decisions reflect the dominant
forces at work in the society? To what extent did these new laws or decisions reflect
changes in a developing society? Such crucial questions overlap many areas of historical
specialization and an up-to-date legal history can 4J.tegrate them into a coherent whole. If
the tasks of legal history are construed broadly enough and the correct questions posed,
the history of American law can be a major area of historical investigation and will contribute substantially to an understanding of the history of an era.
See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 33.

